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| The
Clash of Civilizations Government Model - Page 2 |
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IV. How the Model Works IV.1
Computing De Facto Influences In
the next sections political power will be used by classes and the ruler to
change government policies. That political power is real political power, which
counts in the nominal or by law political power and de facto
influences classes have leading to a higher political power than law says
they should have. De facto influences are the way this model provides
inter-classes interactions, allowing the UC to bribe high officers in
the MC, FE. To compute real political power for each class we need the nominal
values from the Government Profile and de facto influences. Here's how de
facto influences are calculated: Ruler:
He can bribe other "politicians" to gain their sympathy. De
facto influence is computed as a scale parameter multiplying the total
spending in bribes. Upper
Class:
UC de facto influence comes from its control over economy. They can
bribe, they can endorse election campaigns and ask favors afterwards,
use propaganda through the media or directly to their workers, etc. De
facto influence is computed as: Religious
Class:
RC de facto influence comes from the respect and worshiping they receive
from the rest of society. The more intolerant the religion is, the more
willing to use this influence is. That's because intolerant means
religion sees itself as the only Military
Class:
MC de facto influence comes from its ability to militarily threat the government
and politicians. De facto influence in this case is a constant
around 0.15. Bureaucratic
Elite:
BE de facto influence comes, by its definition, from its influence on
the government from the inside and its control over administration. BE's
nominal political power is always zero, since BE's political power comes only from
its de facto influence. BE's power is really unwanted. It's the unwanted
result of a large bureaucratic apparatus. A measure of the size of
bureaucracy is used to compute BE de facto influence: Lower
Class:
LC de facto influence comes from labor unions and the ability to threat
with labor strikes. This influence increases with higher Social Policies
(which protect workers), with higher Civil Rights (which allow the
formation of syndicates and allow strikes legally) and with the level of
syndicating, seen as a social development in the tech tree: IV.2
People's Preferences People
have a clear opinion of what they'd like to see in the govt. As
everything, people see things through the eyes of culture, so cultural
attributes from the social model are taken in to drive people choosing
what they'd want for the govt. What we need is an opinion from every
person for each government policy that needs to be negotiated (i.e. all
policies except tax rate) and for the political structure. IV.2.1
People's Preferences on Directly Negotiated Policies The
policies in this category are: MCM*(MC_U*UC_X
+ MC_L*LC_X + MC_R*Ruler_X) where
MCM is a Military Class Modifier allowing MC members so slightly adapt
their mentality depending on the policy and MC_U, MC_L and MC_R are the
respective influences over the MC by UC, LC and the ruler. LC
wants: SL=2*square_root((100-MCA_EthnicTolerance)*(100-MCA_Asceticism)/10000),
rounded to the closest integer. RC
wants: SL=2*square_root((100-RCM_EthnicTolerance)*(100-RCM_Asceticism)/10000),
rounded to the closest integer. MCM=1 Ethnic
Discrimination (ED) UC
and LC want
ED=(1/(1+exp(5-MCA_Nationalism/10)))*(100-MCA_EthnicTolerance)/10,
rounded to the closest integer. Religious
Discrimination (RD) RC
wants RD=(100-RCM_ReligiousTolerance)*5/100, rounded to the closest
integer. Civil
Rights (CR) UC
and LC want: CR=MCA_Individualism Foreign
Affairs (FA) RC
wants: FA=RCM_Aggressiveness In
this case LC wants a FA policy a little less aggressive than the
aggressiveness of its culture because, after all, it's them that are
going to war. The military prefers a policy a little more aggressive. IV.2.2
People's Preferences: Choosing Ideologies Each
person will look at the available ideologies (discovered/invented
ideologies) and will choose one depending mostly on his culture and how
good it is to his class. To do this, the model computes an
attractiveness for each ideology, on a class basis. That is, the same
ideology has different levels of attractiveness depending on the class
observing it. This will be made for UC, LC and RC but not for MC nor BE.
As in IV.1.1, MC preferences depend on what UC, LC and the ruler want
and BE wants always to preserve the current form of govt. All
persons measure the attractiveness for a given ideology with these four
questions: §
How much power the ideology offers to the class I belong to?
(Desire for Power Attractiveness-DPA) §
How much the ideology reflects my culture? (Cultural
Attractiveness-CA) §
How good the ideology is to solve my economic aspirations?
(Economic Attractiveness-EA) §
How good the ideology is to solve other problems my civ is going
through? (Current Circumstances Attractiveness-CCA) Each
question leads to an attractiveness level (DPA, CA, EA and CCA). Summing
all four we get the total attractiveness the ideology has for someone in
a given class. The following shows how to compute the four effects for a
given ideology seen by class C. Variables in brackets [] represent info
taken from the ideology being processed: i.e.,
the greater the political power the ideology offers to class C, the greater
the attractiveness. 2)
CA=K2*exp(-(ABS([RCpolpower]-exp(-0.04*(105-ImportanceReligion)))+
ABS([MCpolpower]-exp(-0.04*(105-Aggressiveness)))+ ABS((Individualism/100)-(0.2*[PP]+0.8*(1-[SP]))) §
The higher the cultural attribute "Importance of
Religion" is, the greater the attractiveness ideologies offering
high RCpol.power have, and vise versa. §
The higher the cultural attribute "Individualism" is,
the greater the attractiveness ideologies offering capitalistic economic
systems have, and vise versa. §
The higher the cultural attribute "Aggressiveness" is,
the greater the attractiveness ideologies offering high MCpol.power
have, and vise versa. 3)
EA=K3*(A1*[PP] + A2*[EP] +
(A3+A4*(ID/3)+A5*(100-RCM_Individualism)/100)*[SP]) where
In
essence this says the UC likes an economic system with high private
property, low economic planning and no too high social policies. The LC
doesn't care about private property, cares something about economic
planning (because this means some level of control on abusing employers)
and cares very much about social policies. Indeed, LC has growing care
with the more differences between rich and poor (ID=Income
Distribution). RC only cares about social policies and it's a growing
care the less individualistic religion is. Knowledge
Level (KL):
How known an ideology is. It goes in the range 0-100%. If 100% it means
the ideology is perfectly known by the population. When the ideology
tech has not been discovered yet, KL=0%. At the moment of discovery it
becomes 10%. From that point and ahead, KL increases its magnitude (up
to 100%) every turn based on communications techs available.
These
numbers are used to determine what share of the population in each class
support each ideology. This new matrix of support shares will be called
SSM-Support Shares Matrix. We'll say the support share for ideology I in
class C is: exp(W*TotalAttract_I)/sum_over_i(exp(W*TotalAttract_i)) where
W is a scale parameter. Using this exponential formula, differences in
attractiveness are exaggerated and classes tend to concentrate in the
most attractive ideologies. For the matrix of total attractiveness of
the example above, the SSM results in (with W=0.05):
So,
FE, 15% of the LC likes the current state of things. 90% of the RC
supports ideology3. MC_R+(1-
MC_R)*(UC_X*MC_U+LC_X*MC_L) where
UC_X and LC_X are the support shares for the Ruler's Government Profile in the
UC and LC respectively. For any other ideology I, the MC support shares
are computed as LC_I*MC_L
+ UC_I*MC_U where
UC_I and LC_I are the support shares for ideology I in UC and LC
respectively. IV.3
Setting Government Policies Knowing
what people want, now we can model how they'll use their real political power
to actually change government policies to their convenience. IV.3.1
Directly Negotiated Policies Using
the procedures stated in section IV.1, suppose we have each class
preferences for each Directly Negotiated Policies and through a proper
interface the player putted the values he wants for each, so we have
something like this:
Suppose
the actual real political power shares are:
To
compute the final value the government will take for the Foreign Affairs
policy, we make a weighted sum of the values each entity wants, where
weights are the respective political power shares: FA=37*12%
+ 33*25% + 21*26% + 43*7% + 32*11% + 40*18% = 32 IV.3.2
Ideologically Negotiated Policies Again
we'll use the Negotiation Procedure, but in this case classes don't have
a unique value they want. A class, as shown in section IV.1.2, may have
its population divided between several ideologies, so there's no way to
determine specifically what a class wants, as a whole, for any of the
Ideologically Negotiated Policies. That's why we'll use the Negotiation
Procedure on a "party" basis. It'll be like each ideology has
a party in the government trying to impose its ideology and each party has a
political power to do it.
So,
people wanting to preserve the government as it is (supporting the Government
Profile) have 21% of total political power. This one is like the
"Conservative Party".
Using
this info and the political powers each ideology has, the Negotiation
Procedure would give us for Social Policies: IV.4
Circular Effects Although
the Negotiation Procedure is simple to apply, we'll need to apply it
several times in order to reach final values. This happens because
there're circular effects involved. FE, when Private Property is
changed, it is changed using, among other things, real UC political power. But
real UC political power depends on Private Property through de facto
influences. So a change in PP leads to a change in UC political power, which
leads to a change in the entire Political Structure, which leads to more
changes, like the relative influences UC, LC and the ruler have over the
military, leading to a change in MC preferences. This might look like a
mess, but it's not too bad. Some of the calculations described in
previous sections must be carried on several times to achieve an
equilibrium point, but there're two good things: 1) The process is
needed only when negotiations are called, not every turn; 2) It takes
only about 10 iterations to reach equilibrium, which is quite fast.
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